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Abstract  
 
The recent Maystadt report (2013) challenged the European Parliament to modify 
governance arrangements surrounding the design and endorsement of international 
financial reporting standards (IFRS) issued by the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB). In addition the Maystadt report constructs an argument that accounting information 
has the capacity to also modify behaviour and that this might not be conducive for the 
European public good, financial stability and economic development. In this paper we argue 
that IFRS need to be stress tested for their impact on firm-level financial stability in a 
financialized world. The financialized firm can revalue a range of assets to their market value 
crystalizing future earnings into current values but these valuations can become impaired. 
Asset value impairments will be charged to shareholder equity but this is being hollowed 
out because a higher proportion of earnings are being distributed to shareholders. 
Accounting disclosures are not only an information feed to users they inform the 
stewardship and control of a firm’s resources and in the financialized firm the potential for 
financial instability is heightened and this can translate into a moral hazard for society.      
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we argue that it is necessary to differentiate between international financial 
reporting standards (IFRS) as an information feed to ‘users’ and IFRS disclosures that impact 
upon the structure of financial statements and line items in ways that could potentially 
undermine the financial stability of firms, modify resource stewardship and generate a 
moral hazard to society. This paper presents three challenges for policy and academic 
research. First is it possible to design a conceptual framework for accounting that 
incorporates the public interest? Second, can researchers conceptualise and develop new 
innovative modelling frameworks that stress test changes to IFRS in terms of their 
compounding effects and simulate how these would impact upon a firm’s financial stability? 
Third, to what extent is the promotion of firm-level financial stability compatible with 
safeguarding the public interest? These are a key set of challenges for accounting 
academics, policy advisers, practitioners and regulatory bodies following the publication of 
the Maystadt report.     
Phillip Maystadt’s 2013 report “Should IFRS standards be more European?” argued that 
governance arrangements surrounding the endorsement of (IFRS) need to change. It also 
opens up a broader challenge which is to stress test IFRS in terms of their contribution to: 
the European public good; financial stability and economic development. The argument 
developed in this paper is that it is necessary to differentiate between accounting standards 
as defining the provision of information and accounting standards as reinforcing moral 
hazard to society. We are primarily concerned with the second of these challenges, that is, 
stress testing IFRS in relation to the preservation of firm-level financial stability and thereby 
restricting moral hazard to society. This notion of ‘stress testing’ IFRS would be similar to the 
approach adopted by banking regulatory bodies such as that provided by the Basel 
Committee on banking regulation. These regulations are focussed on improving the banking 
sector’s capacity to absorb financial shocks, improve risk management, modify governance 
arrangements and strengthen information disclosures1. The alternative framework for stress 
testing IFRS constructed in this paper draws upon three elements that define the 
‘financialized’ firm. The first of these describes how the composition of corporate balance 
sheets has changed from tangible to intangible assets and financial assets. Second, in the 
financialized firm speculative ‘narratives and numbers’ exaggerate intangible and financial 
asset values in current time but these can be impaired when market prices deflate. Third, 
pressure from institutional investor’s has forced managers to distribute profits to boost 
share prices but this leads to a corresponding hollowing out of shareholder funds. These 
three elements of the financialized firm are interconnected by virtue of double-entry book-
keeping that transmits adjustments within and across financial statements and connect up 
different line items. Thus impairments to intangible asset values will be charged against 
                                                          
1
 http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm?m=3%7C14%7C572 
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shareholder funds which may, for example, not contain sufficient reserves to prevent 
insolvency.   
To evaluate this financialized framework of analysis, and the potential for intangible asset 
value impairments to comprise the financial stability of firms, we review the key financials 
of firms listed in the FTSEurofirst300 constituent list for the period 2000 to 2014. We find 
that there has been a significant adjustment in the structure of corporate balance sheets 
from tangible to intangible assets. These intangible assets contain potential value at risk 
arising, for example, from goodwill accumulations and estimates employed to construct 
mark to market valuations. In addition pressure from institutional investors has forced an 
increasing number of the FTSEurofirst300 to distribute more of their earnings as dividends 
and share buy-backs. This hollows out shareholder equity funds which provide the financial 
buffer to absorb intangible asset impairments. We find over the period 2000 to 2014 the 
proportion of firm’s listed in the FTSEurofirst300 distributing more that 75 percent of their 
income increased from 8 to 25 percent of firms listed. Furthermore, the number of firms 
with intangible asset valuations exceeding shareholder equity increased from 17 to 28 
percent of the sample. 
The rest of the article is organised as follows. The next section provides a summary of the 
current state of accounting affairs in Europe, drawing upon the Maystadt Report. The 
second section discusses accounting in the context of the financialized firm using this 
framework of understanding to construct an alternative approach to stress test the impact 
of IFRS on firm financial stability. The third section employs descriptive financial statistics to 
evaluate the extent to which the FTSEurofirst300 group of firms are increasingly 
financialized and are at heightened risk of insolvency2.    
2. IFRS in the European context: the current state of affairs 
 
Philippe Maystadt’s report: ‘Should IFRS Standards be more European?’ published in 
October 2013 (Maystadt, 2013) raised two fundamental challenges. The first of these 
concerned the governance process surrounding European endorsement of IFRS prepared by 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The second was concerned with the 
general purpose of financial reporting and the extent to which IFRS improved information 
transparency for investors and capital market efficiency at the expense of financial stability 
and the public interest. In June 2015 the European Commission published a Staff Working 
Document (EC, SWD, 2015) on progress achieved in the implementation of governance 
reforms recommended in the Matstadt report. It also provided some opinion on the extent 
to which the adoption of fair value accounting (FVA) within IFRS facilitates capital market 
efficiency for investors at the expense of financial market stability and the public good.    
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 Our focus is on the solvency of firms and we do not construe that insolvent firms are also bankrupt firms.  
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Maystadt’s first challenge was concerned with modifying the governance relationship 
between the IASB, the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), Accounting 
Regulatory Committee (ARC) and European Parliament. EFRAG is made up of experts from 
the private sector, and is supported by an Accounting Regulatory Committee (ARC) which 
votes on and approves IFRS issued by the IASB on behalf of the European Parliament. The 
European Parliament has chosen to renounce its regulatory sovereignty in accounting 
deciding, instead, to apply accounting standards (IFRS) drawn up by a not for-profit private 
sector organisation based in London, the IASB. Changes in governance arrangements are 
being enacted to ensure that the European Parliament is more pro-actively involved in the 
IFRS endorsement process. EFRAG, for example, will be more integrated with the 
Accounting Regulatory Committee (ARC) and European Parliament. 
 
At the ECOFIN Council of 13 November 2012, the Ministers for Finance discussed the 
means by which the European Union could defend its interests more adequately in 
the international accounting debate. They indicated that ARC is the body that should 
represent the European public interest, whereas EFRAG as a technical body, made 
up of experts mainly from the private sector, has no mandate from the Member 
States and …. that in view of the need for both a better coordination of the 
accounting debate in Europe and for a more adequate consideration of the stakes 
related to the political choices in the field of accounting, the existing structures (ARC 
and EFRAG) should be reviewed and new structures should be established if 
necessary (Maystadt, 2013: 5). 
 
A second challenge questioned the general purpose of financial statements; that of 
providing decision useful information for investors to facilitate capital market efficiency. The 
Maystadt report observes that: ‘policy choices in the field of accounting involve public 
interest stakes’ and ‘accounting standards are more than a mere language convention. By 
influencing the behaviour of actors in financial markets, they can have an impact on the 
stability of those markets’ (Maystadt Report, 2013:5). Thus, at a technical level, IFRS 
presented for approval to the European Parliament will need to be stress-tested in terms of 
their impact upon the European public good; financial stability and economic development 
(EFRAG, London, May 2015).  This will require a significant re-orientation because the IFRS 
conceptual framework and objectives of IFRS are geared up to provide decision useful 
information to investors and promote capital market efficiency. And, although there is 
support for these changes there is also a considerable amount of ideological and 
institutional resistance.  
 
A recent Institute of Chartered Accounting in England and Wales (ICAEW) report ‘Moving to 
IFRS reporting: seven lessons learned from the European experience’ (2015) observes that:     
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The influential ‘Maystadt Report’, submitted to the Commission in October 2013, 
considered ways in which the EU could enhance its role in international accounting 
standard-setting. The recommendations of the report on the endorsement process – 
now in the process of being implemented – discussed in particular the possibility of 
expanding the ‘public good’ criterion to make it clear in the law that any accounting 
standards adopted should neither jeopardise financial stability in the EU nor hinder 
the EU’s economic development. (ICAEW, 2015:19) 
 
The issue of how and in what ways accounting standards can heighten the risk of financial 
instability and thereby establish a moral hazard to society is the focus of this paper. The 
IASB’s Conceptual Framework governing the general purpose and objectives of financial 
reporting has traditionally been geared towards the provision of relevant information to 
investors to promote efficient capital markets (an outcome which has been challenged in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis). The conceptual framework governing financial 
reporting also has a tendency to conflate the disclosure of relevant information to investors 
with that of also satisfying the ‘public interest’. This compression of investor interests with 
the public interest is apparent in the IASB’s principal stated objective which is:  
 
‘to develop, in the public interest, a single set of high quality, understandable, 
enforceable and globally accepted international financial reporting standards (IFRSs) 
based upon clearly articulated principles. These standards should require high 
quality, transparent and comparable information in financial statements and other 
financial reporting to help investors, other participants in the world's capital markets 
and other users of financial information make economic decisions’. 3  
 
The IASB’s position is that whilst other stakeholders may find financial disclosures of interest 
the provision of information within financial statements is not ‘primarily directed to these 
other groups’ 
 
Other parties, such as regulators and members of the public other than investors, 
lenders and other creditors, may also find general purpose financial reports useful. 
However, those reports are not primarily directed to these other groups (IASB, 
Conceptual Framework 2010; OB10). 
 
This conflation of ‘investor interests’ with the ‘public interest’ can be challenged on two 
counts. First, accounting standards and financial disclosures have become increasingly 
focussed on the needs of investors and capital markets at the expense of a broader group of 
stakeholders. Second, changes to accounting standards and financial disclosure have 
complex compound impacts that can effect changes to a firms reported financial stability 
and thereby signal adjustments in the stewardship and governance of resources in ways 
that can translate into a real moral hazard to society.   
                                                          
3
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7 
 
2.1 Accounting standards: Information disclosure and public interest 
 
The ‘public interest’ could be served if the objective of IFRS disclosures were expanded to 
meet the needs of a broader group of stakeholders (see IIRC, 2013; Haslam et al 2015). After 
the recent financial crisis the public interest might also be served by promoting firm-level 
‘financial stability’. This latter aim could legitimately take its place alongside relevance and 
true and fair view in the conceptual framework governing accounting and thereby reinforce 
the public-facing standards setting agenda. The financialized firm, which we conceptualise 
later, employs fair value accounting (FVA) to de-temporalize returns, that is, bring forward 
earnings to revalue assets in current time. This presents a potential moral hazard for society 
(see Ireland, 2010) because line items reported within and across financial statements have 
variable properties that can act, in combination, to heighten insolvency risk. Accounting 
standards set out the rules about financial disclosures but the information generated in 
financial statements is also a control device that activates resource stewardship responses 
from managers (see Bowman et al 2015 forthcoming; Biondi 2011).         
With regards to the extending the ‘public interest’ through changes in information 
disclosure Zeff (1999) reminds us that accounting standards and provision of financial 
information could be designed in such a way so as to be of interest to a broader group of 
stakeholders. The IASB’s own discussions, in 2005, on the accounting conceptual framework 
reveal that some consideration had been given to the disclosure of information to a broader 
group of stakeholders: present and potential investors, employees, lenders, suppliers and 
other trade creditors and customers, governments and their agencies and public enterprise 
(See IASB, 2005). It is worth noting these in full.   
(a)  Investors. The providers of shareholders equity and their advisers are concerned 
with the risk inherent in, and return provided by, their investments. They need 
information to help them determine whether they should buy, hold or sell. 
Shareholders are also interested in information which enables them to assess the 
ability of the entity to generated earnings that may enable dividends payment, share 
buy backs and other corporate interventions in capital markets. 
 
(b)  Employees. Employees and their representative groups are interested in information 
about the stability and profitability of their employers. They are also interested in 
information which enables them to assess the ability of the entity to provide 
remuneration, retirement benefits and employment opportunities. 
 
(c)  Lenders. Lenders are interested in information that enables them to determine 
whether their loans, and the interest attaching to them, will be paid when due. 
 
(d) Suppliers and other trade creditors. Suppliers and other creditors are interested in 
information that enables them to determine whether amounts owing to them will be 
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paid when due. Trade creditors are likely to be interested in an entity over a shorter 
period than lenders unless they are dependent upon the continuation of the entity 
as a major customer. 
 
(e) Customers. Customers have an interest in information about the continuance of an 
entity, especially when they have a long-term involvement with, or are dependent 
on, the entity as a supplier of goods and services. 
 
(f) Governments and their agencies. Governments and their agencies are interested in 
the allocation of resources and, therefore, the activities of entities. They also require 
information in order to regulate the activities of entities, determine taxation policies 
and as the basis for national income and similar statistics. 
 
(g) Local communities. Entities affect members of the neighbours in a variety of ways. 
For example, entities may make a substantial contribution to the local economy in 
many ways including the number of people they employ and their patronage of local 
suppliers. Financial statements may assist the public by providing information about 
the trends and recent developments in the prosperity of the entity and the range of 
its activities (see IASB, 2005). 
 
(h)  Public debate and attention to corporate strategies and their shortcomings from a 
financial and extra-financial perspective.  
 
A recent IASB discussion paper has set about amending and updating the accounting 
conceptual framework but the focus remains with the provision of decision useful and 
relevant information to investors (IASB, DP/2013/1).     
 
The objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide financial 
information about the reporting entity that is useful to users of financial statements 
(existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors) in making decisions 
about providing resources to the entity (IASB, 2013:20) 
 
In the aforementioned ICAEW (2015) report the benefits of IFRS are rehearsed and include: 
transparency, comparability, cost of capital, market liquidity, corporate investment 
efficiency and international capital flows. The ICAEW report goes on to make a more 
pointed observation that it would not be sensible to interfere with the IASB’s progress in 
terms of harmonising global financial reporting because this would generate too much 
additional uncertainty for capital markets and thus impede economic development.  
 
9 
 
The IFRS ‘brand’, recognised by capital market participants around the world, cannot 
be trifled with without a risk of devaluing it entirely, endangering the whole global 
IFRS project (ICAEW, 2015:9) 
 
Paul Lee, head of investment affairs at the UK National Association of Pension Funds is also 
quoted in a recent ICAEW blog saying: ‘There are certainly some who want to have political 
control of international standards. There is a threat – and that’s not too strong a word – that 
such an approach will start to move us towards an EU version of IFRS. ‘If what we are 
looking for is comparability, different markets having different flavours of international 
standards is potentially a disaster and takes us back towards the situation where we had 
numerous different GAAPs. Most of all it will erode confidence and that will increase the 
cost of capital,’4 
2.2 Accounting standards: Moral hazard and the public interest 
 
There has been a progressive reorientation in accounting standards from historic cost 
accounting (HCA) towards FVA disclosures for investors. HCA traditionally recorded realised 
revenues and how changes and movements in revenues and expenses impact upon the 
financial position of the firm in the balance sheet. FVA reveals how changes in the market 
value of assets (traded or estimated) impact upon comprehensive income and shareholder 
equity. According to Palea (2014)  
Fair value accounting is one of the most important innovations in financial reporting 
in the European Union, and represents the main difference between IFRS and the 
former European regulation. Fair value is supposed to provide investors with better 
information to predict the capacity of firms to generate cash flow from the existing 
resource base, thereby improving the quality of information for decision usefulness 
(Palea, 2014:3) 
Littleton (2011) observed that economists seek to capitalize future earnings into current 
asset valuations but accountants have been generally predisposed to measure costs actually 
incurred by an enterprise before the current date. 
Economists consider the current value of a business enterprise to be measurable by 
capitalizing the expected earnings of that company…Accountants find expected 
earnings unacceptable for most accounting uses. The reason is found in an 
unwillingness to cut loose their thinking and their service from the provable 
objectivity of accounts kept and financial statements made in terms of costs actually 
incurred by this enterprise before the current date. (Littleton, 2011:4-5) 
                                                          
4
 http://economia.icaew.com/finance/january-2015/ifrs-common-good#sthash.6KpyH3LM.dpuf 
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Biondi (2011) explores the contradictions established by the HCA/FVA duality where fair 
value accounting ‘focalizes on the market reference’ whilst ‘the cost accounting focus is on 
the economic and monetary process generated by the whole enterprise as an economic 
entity and a going concern’(Biondi, 2011:37-8). A number of IFRS now promote the 
application of fair value reporting, that is, either the primary reference is to current market 
prices (if available), or the capitalization of expected future earnings of a firm’s assets, into 
on-going revaluations of assets and liabilities. For example, IFRS 135 outlines a general ‘fair 
value hierarchy’ for the valuation of corporate assets.  
a]  Asset value can be based on quoted prices in active markets for identical assets or 
liabilities,  
b]  quoted prices for similar assets or liabilities in active markets, or  
c]  a reporting entity can develop and model, using unobservable inputs, to generate a 
valuation (using the best information available in the circumstances).  
At the top of the hierarchy values can be adjusted against identical assets traded in active 
markets. Alternatively, towards the bottom of the hierarchy asset values adjusted on the 
basis of estimates and judgements about anticipated future cash flows discounted by an 
appropriate discount rate. Thus, the recognition and measurement of some asset values in a 
firm’s balance sheet are based on estimates, judgements and models rather than exact 
depictions. As a result of the uncertainties inherent in business activities, certain items in 
financial statements cannot be measured precisely but can only be estimated. Estimation 
involves judgements based on the latest available reliable information (EU Directive 
2013/34: para 2). 
The ICAEW (2015) in defence of fair value reporting observed that:  
‘The increased use in financial reporting of fair value measurements – and their 
allegedly pro-cyclical nature – had perhaps received the most attention. We noted 
that in practice, there was no compelling evidence that the use of fair value 
accounting had any significant role in causing or exacerbating the crisis, despite the 
many claims and assertions made in this context’ (ICAEW, 2015:23 and see also 
ICAEW, 2014). 
 
On the contrary it has been argued that this shift in emphasis towards FVA across a number 
of key IFRS contributed to capital market instability during the recent financial crisis (see 
Biondi, 2011; Biondi and Giannoccolo, 2015).  The possibility that fair value accounting 
standards exaggerated capital market instability was a key concern raised in the Maystadt 
Report (2013). In June 2015 the European Commission published a Staff Working Document 
                                                          
5
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(SWD, 2015:1206) ‘Evaluation of Regulation (EC) N° 1606/2002 of 19 July 2002 on the 
application of International Accounting Standards’. This document summarises a review of 
the literature on the impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the EU and on the 
performance of IFRS during the (financial) crisis. It also drew upon internal experience of 
relevant international and European bodies and the evaluation took account of the 
Maystadt recommendations. This report observes that: 
The crisis evidenced the need to understand the effects of regulations on financial 
markets and on economies. The IAS Regulation specifies that as a condition to being 
brought into EU, international standards must be conducive to the European public 
good. The term ‘public good’ is not defined but may be understood to encompass 
broad financial stability and economic considerations. In particular, it is necessary to 
assess whether accounting standards could be detrimental to the economy or to 
particular stakeholders, such as long-term investors. There is also a growing call for 
regulations to be considered holistically in terms of their cumulative effects. 
(European Commission, 2015:7) 
The European Commission and European Parliament are rightly concerned to ensure that 
IFRS contribute to ‘financial stability’ and do not present a moral hazard to society. This 
means that the IASB and European regulatory bodies need to ensure that accounting 
standards are reviewed holistically to evaluate their ‘cumulative effects’. It is necessary to 
stress test accounting standards in terms of their compound relation and impact on the 
financial stability and solvency of firms in the public interest (Haslam, 2015). FVA has been 
deployed within a number of key IFRS and our argument is that these changes have not 
been adequately stress-tested to assess their impact on firm financial stability and moral 
hazard to society. This weakness is evident in Bischof and Daske (2015) report ’Endorsement 
Criteria in Relation to IFRS 9’ commissioned by the European Department for Economic 
Policy.  Bischof and Daske argue that the European Public Good (EPG) is captured within the 
process of IFRS endorsement. With regards to IFRS9 the opinions of key stakeholders, that 
is, preparers and users of financial information are collected and these are employed to 
construct a cost-benefit evaluation. This cost-benefit analysis compares ‘net costs’ and ‘net 
benefits’ to preparers and users and the difference then employed to generate the overall 
position on endorsement: ‘the vast majority of stakeholders consider IFRS 9 as contributing 
to the EPG’ (Bischof and Daske, 2015:38).  
Overall, we still tend to conclude that, at least, many features of IFRS 9 are an 
improvement over IAS 39, which would be the alternative if the EU voted against the 
endorsement of IFRS 9. Therefore, we argue that IFRS 9 is likely to be conducive to 
the European public good and we recommend the standard to be endorsed by the 
EU (Bischof and Daske, 2015:39). 
                                                          
6
 http://ec.europa.eu/finance/accounting/docs/ias-evaluation/20150618-swd_en.pdf 
 
12 
 
The endorsement process described by Bischof and Daske reinforces a narrow stakeholder 
engagement because the opinions that matter are predominantly those from users and 
preparers of financial statements. Furthermore, collecting opinions on a standard is not the 
same as carrying out a robust stress test to evaluate the compound and inter-related 
impacts that new and modified IFRS might have on the financial stability of firms. In this 
paper we argue that it is necessary to contextualize the endorsement of accounting 
standards within a financialized world. The literature on financialization provides a useful 
framing device within which to locate financial reporting because it reveals cumulative 
effects and how these impact on firm solvency and financial stability. IFRS issued by the IASB 
are not simply an abstract technical reporting function. In a financialized world the reported 
financial numbers and related accounting standards are influenced by institutional relations 
and agency realignments that are dynamically recalibrating the nature and properties of 
reported financial information. On the asset side we observe a compositional shift from 
tangible to intangible assets including accumulating goodwill which records the difference 
between the market and book value of business combinations (Biondi, 2013). Tangible 
assets such as real estate, financial assets, marketable securities and derivatives, are also 
periodically marked to market. On the liabilities side of the balance sheet shareholder 
equity functions as a firebreak absorbing fluctuations in earnings and also buffering the 
impact of asset value impairments. The accumulation of shareholder equity itself depends 
upon whether dividends pay-out ratios and share buy backs are increasing because a higher 
distribution of earnings will impact negatively on the accumulation of a firm’s retained 
earnings which are also a major component of shareholder equity.  
In a financialized world the asset values reported by firms on their balance sheets are 
increasingly de-temporalized because they embody past, present and future speculation 
about cash flows and discount rates. Small changes in assumptions about the future will 
have a magnified impact on asset values in current time. Changes to the value of assets will 
be transmitted by virtue of the system of double entry book-keeping into shareholder 
equity on the liabilities side of the balance sheet. Double entry book-keeping not only 
transmits financial disturbance between line items but there is the added risk that relatively 
immaterial adjustments to one line item can trigger a material change in another. For 
example, goodwill or other assets impairments, as well as on-going revaluations, could 
undermine shareholder equity (Haslam et al, 2012). In the next section of this article we 
argue that the endorsement of financial reporting standards needs to be contextualised 
within a process of economic transformation that we summarise as the ‘financialized firm’ 
3. Financial reporting and the financialized firm 
 
According to Epstein ‘some writers use the term ‘financialization’ to mean the ascendancy 
of ‘shareholder value’ as a mode of corporate governance; some use it to refer to the 
growing dominance of capital market financial systems over bank-based financial systems; 
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some to the increasing political and economic power of a particular class grouping: the 
‘rentier class’ (Epstein, 2005:3). Orhangazi uses the term ‘financialization’ to capture the 
complex relations between ‘financial markets and other aspects of the economy’ 
(Orhangazi, 2008 xiv). Carruthers (2015) observing that financialization, involves the 
development and evolution of financial markets and how institutions adapt and respond to: 
governing property rights, information exchange, regulation and failure of firms (Carruthers, 
2015:379-380). Van der Zwan (2014) notes that: ‘scholars of financialization should pay 
more attention to the complex processes of transformation, which sometimes advance and 
at other times hamper the advent of finance capitalism in the advanced political economies’ 
(Van der Zwan, 2014:120).  
 
For the purpose of this paper we argue that the literature on financialization can be 
employed to generate insight about structural adjustments to the nature of corporate 
financial statements. First, Krippner (2005) describes the process of financialization as the 
‘rise of finance in the United States’ where profits accrue through financial channels rather 
than through trade and commodity production. Financial here refers to activities relating to 
the provision (or transfer) of liquid capital in expectation of future interest, dividends, or 
capital gains’ (Krippner, 2005:174-5). Watkins (2015) notes that Keynes, in an earlier period, 
was concerned with ‘changing views about the future’ where value no longer simply arises 
from producing commodities in the present but also  depends on expectations. Thus a firm’s 
assets are valued not on cost, but on ‘prospective earning capacity’ and this transforms ‘the 
determination of the value of an asset from the costs of physical commodities to intangible 
assets’ and a new way of making money (Watkins, 2015:7).  Second, Froud et al (2000, 2006) 
argue that financialization is about how the asset valuation process combines both 
‘technical’ and ‘rhetorical’ elements as ‘numbers and narratives’ (Froud et al, 2006:71). Thus 
asset values marked to market in a firm’s balance sheet not only embody speculative 
assumptions about a firms future earnings possibilities but also capture  the modus operandi 
of active capital markets that promote the vendibility of assets at the expense of the 
serviceability of these assets (Haslam et al, 2012).  The health warning, as Veblen observed, 
is that ‘it is the intangible element of value that tends to be the widest and the freest’ 
(Veblen, 2005:76). Third, Lazonick (2013) argues that financialization is about a dominant 
ideology of shareholder value, that is, the ‘mode of corporate resource allocation has been 
legitimized by the ideology, itself a product of the 1980s and 1990s, that a business 
corporation should be run to maximize shareholder value’ (Lazonick, 2013: 859). Lazonick’s 
argument is that firms, in the US, have become preoccupied with maximising short-run 
returns on capital to investors and this includes distributing more profit to shareholders, as 
dividends and share buy-backs (See also Andersson et al 2008;  Lazonick, 2011; Biondi 2012; 
Haslam et al, 2012; Stout, 2012; Clarke, 2013) 
Accounting numbers are not simply a record describing the financial performance of the 
firm they are also a mirror reflecting the financialized world. Asset valuations become the 
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product of speculation and expectations about future cash flows adjusted by discount rates.  
Managers are encouraged by institutional investors and financial incentives to distribute 
profits either as dividends or share buy-backs rather than retain funds in shareholder equity 
reserves. In this financialized world speculative intangible asset values accumulate but there 
is the risk of financial instability when valuations become impaired. In circumstances where 
managers are also distributing profit rather than retaining funds this will reduce the capacity 
of shareholder equity to absorb asset value impairments, prevent insolvency and dampen 
financial instability.    
 
The accounting professional bodies and accounting standards setting agencies are actors 
that have influence over the way in which financial information is filtered and recorded in a 
firm’s financial statements. We have already noted that the IASB and its affiliated 
accounting and auditing professional bodies govern the purpose of the conceptual 
framework that outlines the general objectives of financial reporting. The overriding 
objective of financial reporting is the disclosure of information that is relevant and ‘decision 
useful’ for investors that provide capital. This is reflected in a general re-orientation in 
financial reporting from HCA towards FVA reporting that adjusts asset values to those based 
on active liquid capital markets or, in the absence of such active markets, valuation models. 
This ‘fair value’ information, it is argued, reflects the true costs of financial resources 
employed by firms. Gigler et al (2013) suggest that:  
 
‘While the arguments supporting fair value accounting are not based on any formal 
analytical models that we are aware of, the intuition underlying its support seems to 
be the following. The current market values of a firm’s assets and liabilities are much 
more descriptive of a firm’s financial position/wealth than their historical acquisition 
cost’ (Gigler et al, 2013:2).  
 
As we have already noted, a range of extant IFRS now permit mark to market adjustments 
to the asset side of the firm’s balance sheet including: Business Combinations (IFRS3), 
Financial Instruments (IAS32 and 39, superseded by IFRS9), Property, Plant and Equipment 
(IAS16), Intangibles (IAS 38), Agriculture (IAS41). This change in orientation to FVA modifies 
the asset structure of firm balance sheets inflating intangible and financial assets in total 
assets. A significant share of these intangible and financial assets are subject to an on-going 
process of re-capitalization using valuation data obtained from active secondary asset 
markets or modelling exercises that mimic asset pricing in active markets. 
 
The fair value determination of identified intangible assets relies on a number of 
important assumptions as well as forecast data, both of which introduce subjectivity 
into the valuation process. Many acquiring companies have used these areas of 
discretion to allocate a high percentage of the purchase consideration to goodwill in 
order to reduce the future amortisation charge associated with the identified 
intangible assets purchased as part of the transaction (KPMG, 2010:12-13) 
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Thus the asset side of a firm’s balance sheets contains accumulating market values but the 
health risk is that they can become impaired and the system of double entry book-keeping 
will transmit any financial disturbance to maintain assets ≡ liabilities. This aggregate identity 
disguises the fact that line items on the asset / liability side of a balance sheet may (or may 
not) have an equivalent capacity to absorb financial disturbance (Andersson, et al 2014). 
Lazonick also reminds us that US firms have financialized strategy, that is, they are 
distributing more of their profits in the form of dividends and share buy-backs rather than 
reinvesting in productive capacity. Lazonick (2014) observes that:  
 
The allocation of corporate profits to stock buybacks deserves much of the blame. 
Consider the 449 companies in the S&P 500 index that were publicly listed from 
2003 through 2012. During that period those companies used 54% of their 
earnings—a total of $2.4 trillion—to buy back their own stock, almost all through 
purchases on the open market. Dividends absorbed an additional 37% of their 
earnings. That left very little for investments in productive capabilities or higher 
incomes for employees Lazonick, 2014:4. 
The importance of relatively high dividend pay-out ratios coupled with share buy-backs is 
that both these transactions are accounted for as a deduction from shareholder equity in 
the balance sheet. These distributions to shareholders act independently on the 
accumulation of shareholder equity such that this line item could be moving along a 
completely different trajectory than that of the fair value accumulating in intangible and 
financial assets. In chart 3 we show that for firms listed in the major European stock markets 
intangible assets are accumulating ahead of shareholder equity.  
The IASB’s reorientation from HCA to FVA in extant IFRS is motivated by the need to satisfy 
the information demands from investors and capital market institutions (see Ryan, 2008; 
Biondi, 2011). But the risk is that relatively small changes in valuation assumptions about 
future cash flows and discount rates will amplify asset impairments in current time. Small 
changes to asset values could have a material impact on shareholder equity funds 
undermining financial stability because leverage ratios, credit ratings and solvency tests are 
compromised. Financial disturbance also modifies resource stewardship and governance 
arrangements because accounting is also a control and accountability device (Biondi 2011). 
In this way changes to IFRS and the way in which financial information is constructed and 
disclosed becomes a moral hazard to society.  
4. Stress testing IFRS in a Financialized World  
 
In this paper we have argued that IFRS need to be stress tested within the context of the 
financialized firm. The analysis in this section therefore reveals the extent to which balance 
sheet asset structures are changing, whether firms are distributing a higher share of their 
earnings and extent to which shareholder equity funds have been hollowed out relative to 
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intangible assets for firms listed in the FTSEurofirst300 index7. Financial data is employed to 
construct three key indicators: first the ratio of intangible (including goodwill) to tangible 
assets, second the ratio of income distributed (dividends and share buy-backs) out of total 
income and third the ratio of intangible assets to shareholder equity. 
Starting with the ratio of intangible to total assets we find that this averaged 12 percent in 
the year 2000 and by 2014 this had moved up to an average of 22 percent.  This overall 
average conceals a material adjustment in the distribution of firms with an increased share 
of intangible to total assets (see chart 1). For example in the year 2000 thirteen percent of 
firms surveyed had an intangible to total assets ratio of more than 30 percent but by the 
year 2014 one-third of firms surveyed had an intangible to total assets ratio of more than 30 
percent.  
 
Source: Data obtained from Thomson Reuters FTSE Eurofirst 300. 
Notes: A sample of 261 companies out of 300 listed in the FTSEurofirst 300 report valid 
matched data in 2000 and 2014 for intangibles and total assets. The ratio for intangibles to 
total assets is computed and then firms are independently ranked for each year 2000 and 
2014. Our objective is to establish the extent to which more firms in 2014 have a higher 
intangible to total assets ratio than in the earlier year 2000. 
 
In chart 2 we describe the share of net income distributed as dividends and share buy-backs 
for a matched set of firms listed in the FTSEurofirst300. This chart shows that an increasing 
number of firms are distributing more than 75 percent of their net income and more firms 
are financing distributions to shareholders from externally sourced funds. In the year 2000 
approximately 8 percent of firms distributed more than three quarters of their net income. 
In 2014 the proportion of firms distributing more than three quarters of their net income 
                                                          
7
The FTSEurofirst 300 Index comprises the 300 largest companies ranked by market capitalisation in the FTSE 
Developed Europe Index. 
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has risen to 25 percent and roughly half of all firms surveyed distributed more than fifty 
percent of their net income. 
 
 
 
Source: Data obtained from Thomson Reuters FTSE Eurofirst 300. 
Notes: Notes: 250 companies surveyed out of 300 listed in the FTSEurofirst 300 report valid 
matched data in 2000 and 2014 for dividends, share buy-backs and net income. The 
distribution ratio is computed and then firms are independently ranked for each year 2000 
and 2014. Our objective is to establish the extent to which more firms in 2014 have a higher 
distribution ratio than in the earlier year 2000. 
 
In combination a higher ratio of intangible assets in total assets and increased distribution of 
earnings contributes to an increasing intangible asset to shareholder equity ratio for firms 
listed in the FTSEurofirst300 group. In 2014 some 28 percent of firm’s surveyed reported 
intangible assets with a value that exceeded shareholder equity funds compared to 17  
percent of firms surveyed in the year 2000 (see chart 3). Over the period 2000 to 2014 an 
increased number of firms in the FTSEurofirst300 group have a higher intangible to 
shareholder equity ratio. 
 
 
76 
16 
4 4 
0 0 0 
52 
24 
11 9 
3 1 1 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0<0.50 >0.5<0.75 >0.75<1.0 >1<2.0 >2.0<3.0 >3.0<4.0 >4.0>5.0
Sh
ar
e
 o
f 
fi
rm
s 
in
 s
am
p
le
 (
%
) 
Dividends and share buy-backs to net income  
Chart 2 FTSE Eurofirst300: Dividends and share buy-backs in net income 
Year 2000 Year 2014
18 
 
 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters 
Notes: Sample comprises 239 companies out of the FTSEurofirst300 reporting valid matched 
data in 2000 and 2014 for intangibles and shareholder equity. The ratio for intangibles to 
shareholder equity is computed and then firms independently ranked for each year 2000 
and 2014. Our objective is to reveal the extent to which more firms in 2014 have a higher 
intangible to shareholder equity ratio than in the earlier year 2000. 
 
In figure 1 we outline a stylised stress testing model for IFRS in a financialized world. This 
model captures the interrelationship between line items and how these are subject to 
variable influence. For example, a higher distribution of earnings will slow down the growth 
of retained earnings in shareholder funds relative to asset values that crystalize future 
earnings potential into their current valuations.  These variable properties set line items on 
different trajectories such that the accumulation of asset value at risk runs ahead of 
shareholder funds.  In the final section of our analysis we have selected nine European firms 
which collectively account for 1.1 million employees (see table 1). This group of firms have 
been chosen using the filter described in figure 2 which represents the model depicted in 
figure 1 but now in the form of a set of interrelated key financial ratios. These nine firms are 
selected because they have a shared experience, that is, over a period of time, they have 
migrated from a low to high intangible to total assets ratio, a low to high income distribution 
ratio and higher intangible assets to shareholder equity ratio.  
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Figure 1: A stylised stress testing model for IFRS in a financialized world   
 
 
. 
Figure 2: Case study choice filter 
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Over the period 2000 to 2014 the nine European companies listed in table 1 have 
experienced changes to the structure of their balance sheets with intangible assets 
(including goodwill) increasing relative to total assets (see Chart 4). Surprisingly this chart 
reveals that during the recent financial crisis the intangible to total assets ratio remained 
reasonably steady suggesting that intangible assets were not being heavily impaired. Biondi 
(2013: 152) observes that so far preparers and auditors have been reluctant to impair 
goodwill but that ‘this accounting choice appears questionable’. For this group of nine firms 
intangible assets continue to accumulate relative to total assets after the financial crisis. 
Table 1: Financialized accounts for nine European firms  
 
Firm No of Employees (2014) 
GlaxoSmithKline       (UK) 98,792 
BT Group                  (UK) 87,800 
BAE Systems             (UK) 76,000 
Bayer                        (Germany)                        118,888 
E-on                          (Germany) 58,503 
Siemens                    (Germany)                        343,000 
Sanofi                       (France)                        113,496 
Schneider Electric    (France)                        185,965 
Legrand                    (France)                          33,556 
Totals                     1,120,270 
  Source: Thomson Reuters 
 
 
Source: Data obtained from Thomson Reuters 
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Chart 5 shows that for this group of nine firm’s intangible assets were equivalent to one-
quarter of the value of shareholder equity funds in the year 2000 but by the year 2014 the 
value of intangible assets, on average, exceeded shareholder funds.  
 
Source: Data obtained from Thomson Reuters 
Chart 6 describes the ratio of distributable shareholder funds (retained earnings) to 
intangible assets. This ratio describes the extent to which distributable shareholder funds 
can cover holding losses that might arise from the impairment of intangible assets.  
 
Source: Data obtained from Thomson Reuters2 
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Our analysis for the nine European firms shows that the ratio of distributable shareholder 
equity to intangible assets has fallen over the period 2000 to 2014 with the majority of the 
adjustment taking place between the years 2002-2004. Thereafter there has been a gentle 
further decline in the distributable equity to intangible asset ratio from around 50 percent 
to below 40 percent coverage. Even more fragile scenarios are possible. Some firms might 
deplete unrestricted equity funds (retained earnings and other reserves) and erode 
restricted shareholder equity (original capital and share premium).  In these circumstances 
there is very little headroom to absorb intangible asset impairments such as that arising out 
of goodwill impairments as chart 7 reveals in the case study of GlaxoSmithKline.  
 
 
Source: Data obtained from Thomson Reuters 
Since 1995 GalxoSmithKline (GSK) generated £73.6 billion of net income and distributed 
£67.3 billion, that is, distributions accounted for 90 percent of net income. Shareholder 
equity (retained funds) in GSK were also further eroded by the need to account for market 
value losses on defined benefit (DB) pension schemes because the fair value of scheme 
assets, have in recent years, been valued below the value of liabilities.  In 2014 GSK’s 
accumulated goodwill arising out of business combinations is equivalent to 90 percent of its 
total equity funds and if we add to this the value of all other intangibles this would equate 
to three times the value of total shareholder equity funds.  BT Group, another of our nine 
companies, has reported negative shareholder equity in the financial years 2013 to 2014 but 
still records intangible assets and goodwill to the value of £6bn on the asset side of its 
balance sheet. Our argument is that firms are increasingly exposed to potential holding 
losses, for example, in 2015 Tesco PLC a UK grocery retailer announced fair value 
impairments to its property portfolio and other one-off other impairment valuation 
adjustments totalling £6.2bn. This change to its asset values triggered a substantial 42 
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percent decline in reported shareholder equity and a significant deterioration in the debt to 
equity ratio from 0.6:1 to 1.24:1     
5. Summary/Discussion 
 
Philippe Maystadt’s (2013) report challenged the European Parliament to reform the 
governance process associated with the endorsement of IFRS and issued a broader 
requirement that IFRS promote financial stability in the public interest. A follow-on 
European Commission working paper (2015) reviewed the impact of IFRS on financial 
market stability and concluded that, as part of the endorsement process, IFRS do need to be 
evaluated holistically in terms of their cumulative effects.  
 
The central objective governing the IASB’s role in setting IFRS is that of providing relevant 
information to investors so as to promote the efficient functioning of capital markets. The 
IASBs mission statement conflates the public interest with the information needs of 
investors and an efficient functioning of capital markets. The Maytstadt report implied that 
accounting information can modify behaviour and impact upon the stability of capital 
markets. An on-going debate has focussed on the extent to which the adoption of FVA in 
IFRS contributed to financial market instability during the last financial crisis against the 
public interest. The Maytstadt report was therefore concerned to integrate financial 
stability and the public interest element into the endorsement process for IFRS.  
 
It is necessary to differentiate between IFRS as an information feed to ‘users’ and how IFRS 
disclosures impact upon the structure of financial statements and line items in ways that 
could potentially undermine the financial stability of firms, modify resource stewardship and 
generate a moral hazard to society. IFRS need to be stress tested to assess their impact 
upon the financial stability of firms. In this paper we have employed the literature on the 
financialized firm to construct an alternative framework for stress testing IFRS. This 
framework describes changes to the composition of total assets where fair value reporting 
crystallises future earnings into current asset valuations. These valuation adjustments are by 
their nature speculative and can become impaired. The potential for asset impairments is 
accumulating at the same time as shareholder equity funds are being hollowed out. The 
analysis in this paper finds that large firms listed in the main European stock markets are 
accumulating intangible assets that contain mark to market adjustments in their total 
assets. It also concludes that, for an increasing number of firms in Europe, the shareholder 
equity buffer is being hollowed out. The potential for asset impairments to undermine 
shareholder equity, damage credit ratings, solvency and the financial stability of large firms 
in Europe has increased. 
 
EFRAG and the ARC (representing European political interests) continue to evaluate IFRS in 
relation to the costs and benefits of accounting standards for preparers and users of 
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accounting information.  The primary objective of IFRS issued by the IASB is with the 
provision of information to investors so as to promote capital market efficiency. In this 
paper we argue that changes to IFRS also impact upon the structure of a firm’s financial 
statements and modify the relation between line items. Changes to individual IFRS have 
compounding effects which can increase the potential for financial instability in firms and 
because accounting informs governance and resource stewardship this can translate into a 
moral hazard for society.   
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